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There appears to be increasing interest among certain educational institutions to 
include values as a prominent feature of their practice (Buckley & Erricker, 2004).  
One recent example is the Victorian Curriculum Assessment Authority (VCAA) who 
released a discussion paper earlier this year, which indicates that values are to play a 
much greater role in government schools.  However, endeavouring to promote values 
as common standards can be criticised to be problematic in our pluralist society, 
because not all values are necessarily valuable. 
 
This paper reviews the VCAA paper and attempts to respond to Nietzsche’s (1998) 
challenge to question the value of our values, by offering guidance as to how the 
educative value of values might be determined.  Such an examination is expected to 
identify a potential tension between a particular civic education and that of a more 
philosophic and universally educative perspective.  In order to do this, a 
differentiation between a value (noun) as ‘objective fact’ and value (verb) as a 
‘subjective relation’ is made.  This paper will adopt an existential perspective by 
drawing upon consequentialism, intentionality and the works of Kierkegaard and 
Dewey, to argue that emphasis should be placed on the subjective aspects of educative 
valuing without fostering an objective/subjective divide. 
 
VCAA Discussion Paper 
At the end of March 2004, the VCAA discussion paper titled A Framework of 
‘Essential Learning’ was published, with the initial consultation period to be 
concluded by the end of June.  This document signalled that the Labour government 
intends to replace the Curriculum Standards Framework (CSF) which had been 
established in 1995 by the previous Liberal government.  From initial consultation the 
authors of the new VCAA document suggest that there is a need to build the 
framework upon a clear set of values.  They propose that three ‘pillars’ are to form 
such a basis, and these are:  
 
1. human understanding is organised through disciplines of knowledge  
 represented by key concepts;  
2. students require generic or cross-curriculum skills; and 
3. the core business of education is personal and social development. 
 
This third ‘pillar’ of personal and social development involves knowledge, skills, 
values and personal attributes.  While no mention of where this notion of the ‘pillars’ 
originated, it does appear that there may be indirect reference to the four pillars in 
UNESCO’s document Learning: The Treasure Within (Delors, 1998).  UNESCO’s 
pillars include:  
 
1. learning to know;  
2. learning to do;  
3. learning to live together, learning to live with others; and  
4. learning to be.   
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However, the pillars in this UNESCO document are fundamentally different to those 
of the VCAA. 
 
In Victorian education, the trend through the 1970s was of social justice, but during 
the early 1980s this changed to economic rationalism.  The CSF document in 1995 
was immersed quite fully into this economic perspective, and made values less 
explicit emphasising instead skills, knowledge and competencies (Ling et al., 1998, p. 
48).  With reference to the Australian State and Territory Ministers for Education 
(MCEETYA) agreement in 2002 that there should be a values education study, the 
VCAA document proposes a set of ten values which is argued to have emerged from 
studying various Australian school communities and which are adopted to underpin 
the framework.   These values consist of; 
 
1. Tolerance and understanding 
2. Respect 
3. Responsibility 
4. Social Justice 
5. Excellence 
6. Care 
7. Inclusion and trust 
8. Honesty 
9. Freedom, and 
10. Being ethical. 
 
The implied justification for this particular set of values appears embedded within the 
described purposes of education.  The document states that there are two main 
purposes of education which clearly appeal to ends beyond itself for its justification.  
These purposes of education are describes as: 
 
1)  To equip students with knowledge, skills and attributes to: 
  • Contribute socially, economically and culturally to society 
  • Be responsible individuals capable of relating to family, friends and  
     colleagues 
  • Be informed citizens who understand and contribute to civil and  
      community relations at a local, national and global level 
 
2)  To prepare students for a world which is: 
  • Knowledge rich 
• Global in its outlook and influences 
• Consistently and rapidly changing 
• Complex in its political and economic structures 
• A pervasive ICT environment 
 
and in which students need to deal with issues in: 
  • Conflict management 
  • Distribution of resources and choices 
  • Environment sustainability 
 
(Victorian Curriculum Assessment Authority, 2004, p. 5) 
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While this framework document indicates that these ten values are to be taught and 
learned, it is contended here that these values do not necessarily have educative value.  
Indeed the UNESCO document mentioned earlier claims that “Education cannot be 
satisfied with bringing individuals together by getting them to accept common values 
shaped in the past.  It must also answer the question as to what for and why we live 
together” (Delors, 1998, p. 61).  This latter assertion is clearly absent from the VCAA 
framework, which requires learners to be compliant to a standard set of values but 
fails to offer any meaningful vision for why we live together, other than economic 
imperatives. 
 
It would appear that in addition to the discourse which stresses the relationship that 
education systems have with national economies, (Lawton and Cowen, 2001, p. 17), 
the ideology of the global citizen is also present in this document, which when 
examined in detail, is not that far removed from the ideologies which fuelled various 
nationalisms through this last century.  This is evident when learners are referred to as 
‘citizens’, which by definition, essentialises personhood to that of a governed entity.  
Lawton and Cowen (2001, p. 24) predict that educational aims which focus upon 
acting according to ideals of the good citizen and the productive worker also usually 
entails a shift away from notions of the learner as a moral person capable of ethical 
reasoning and judgment making.  Their prediction would appear to be validated by the 
content of this document. 
 
 
Are Values Valuable? 
Educational researchers acknowledge that “the concept of what a value might be is 
contested and elusive” (Halstead and Taylor, 1996 in Yates, 2000, p. 26).  This is 
certainly most relevant for educators, as Paul Hirst (1965, p. 115) argues that 
education “necessarily involves considerations of value”.  The term ‘value’ can be 
used as both a noun and a verb and this characteristic demands that educators need to 
be clear what is actually being taught and how educative value is to be determined. 
 
Objectifying values, as is the manner found in the VCAA document, is also 
recommended by Talbot (2000, p. 15) who finds it useful to contextualise issues by 
asking the question “what are values?”.  The specific structure of his question centred 
on ‘what’, invites responses that contribute to notions of principles (rules) and 
standards (ideals) beyond individual subjectivity.  According to MacIntyre (1987) the 
adoption of values as nouns and as commonly accepted standards makes rational 
discussion about them possible.  Such a positioning would indicate that values could 
be ‘things’ understood as ‘social facts’ (Durkheim, 1982). 
 
As social facts these values may be regarded as ‘standards’ of quality which have 
intrinsic worth.  Such standards of value have been suggested to be qualities of 
general education, and even for example more specifically mathematics education, 
consisting of such characteristics as honesty, rationalism and the habit of getting 
students to check their answers (Bishop, FitzSimons, Seah & Clarkson, 1999, p. 4).  
Such descriptions tend to indicate that values have an existence beyond individual 
persons.  They have been stated as phenomena with their own existence which 
persons need to be aware of, respond to and become committed to, as described in the 
VCAA framework.   
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Endeavouring to promote values as common standards can be criticised to be 
problematic in our pluralist society (Haydon, 1993, p. 14) as a non-existent 
monoculture is implied.  Nietzsche wrote to a great extent about the plurality and 
genealogy of values, conceptualising them to be items that we can either posit or 
‘unposit’.  Values are not necessarily valuable and consequently they do not, and 
cannot, dictate meaning to persons as agents. 
 
This is not simply a characterisation of postmodernity, because even through 
modernity we never have had values that were able to transmit meaning to us and 
dictate the way lives were to be lived.  A direct implication of this conceptualisation is 
that as ‘objects’, values have no intrinsic worth.  As ‘facts’ they are unable to 
demonstrate universal goodness. 
 
John Dewey (1958, p. 281) clearly identified this apparent subjective/verb (valuing) 
and objective/noun (value) divide.  He stated that – 
 
The underlying issue here is whether “value” is a noun standing for something 
that is an entity in its own right or whether the word is adjectival, standing for 
a property or quality that belongs, under specifiable conditions, to a thing or 
person having existence independently of being valued. (Dewey, 1958, pp. 
276-277) 
 
He identified that if values were extrinsic or “instrumental” then they could be 
rationally estimated.  However, if they were to be regarded as such it needs to be 
pointed out that they are only means to ends and that these ends “are just matters of 
what groups, classes, sects, races or whatever, happen irrationally to like or dislike 
(Dewey, 1958, p. 9). 
 
While his notion of ‘irrationality’ may be more helpfully understood as ‘non-
rationality’ he does nevertheless indicate that ‘objectively’ values – as social facts – 
are problematic.  Dewey is often understood to have opposed dichotomies and this is 
yet another.  What he argued for was a “critical engagement” between “individual 
thought and group sanction” (Kneller, 1971, p. 229).  This problematic nature of 
‘values’ needs to be carefully considered before promoting them as standards of 
essential learning to be developed in any educational framework. 
 
The alternative focus that is being offered here is upon valuing rather than values.  As 
a verb it is something that persons are actively engaged with.  Something of each 
person is present and involved in each act of valuing.  It is argued here that such 
valuing is founded upon the intentionality of each person. 
 
An atomistic view of the individual is not subscribed to here as this notion of valuing 
would then become solipsistic.  It is argued that as social beings people have 
intersubjective common grounds that allow us to form common meanings much as 
portrayed by the community of scientists who operate from the same paradigm of 
understanding as found in Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) argument in his book The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions.  In order to clarify this further and to argue for this 
alternative focus for educational research it is useful to examine the ethical 
perspective of consequentialism. 
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Consequentialism 
Values are considered to be an aspect of ethics because they deal with good and bad, 
right and wrong.  Consequentialism and non-consequentialism are two major and 
quite different perspectives of ethical theory.  The former usually indicates that value 
is to be indicated in the outcome or consequence of an act, while the latter refers to an 
act itself having value.  Non-consequentialism sees intrinsic value in acts which are 
then considered to be one’s duty such as the practice of the Golden Rule.  Such a 
perspective traditionally referred to as deontological ethics claims that these duties are 
absolute and universal, and therefore we are obliged to keep them.  Immanuel Kant 
and his notion of the categorical imperative are often associated with this perspective. 
 
Consequentialism on the other hand, is often referred to as teleological theory.  The 
‘good’ that is achieved from an act can be good for the agent in action or it can be for 
the good of the many (e.g. John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism).  Consequentialism often 
promotes individual freedom and responsibility such as with situationalism.  For 
postmodern times, Bagnall (1998, p. 322, 318) argues that “situationalism is the only 
truly moral response” because the demise of the modernist ethical theories, codes and 
rules have left individuals “ethically naked...abandoned... to the contingency of moral 
circumstances”.  It could be concluded then that such a position is the only sensible 
one to adopt for a pluralistic society such as ours. 
 
While the VCAA document clearly indicates that ‘being ethical’ is one of the ten 
agreed values, their description of what this entails appears more in keeping with 
compliant citizenship rather than any notion of moral personhood.  The document 
describes that this value of being ethical means “acting in accordance with generally 
agreed rules and/or standards for right [moral] conduct or practice”.  This of course is 
more in keeping with a deontological approach which is quite inadequate according to 
Bagnall and appears to validate Lawton and Cowen’s prediction that an emphasis on 
the dutiful and productive citizen would marginalize the notion of the learner as a 
moral person. 
 
The authors of the VCAA document make the claim that their proposed list of agreed 
values be linked to standards which will be used to measure student development.  If 
values are to be considered as standards or ‘things’ such as ‘facts’, then they exist 
independently of any individual subjectivity and are universal to all people.  As 
Kierkegaard has argued – 
 
The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, 
which can be put from another point of view by saying that it applies at every 
moment.  It rests immanently in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its telos 
[end, purpose] but is itself the telos for everything outside”. (Kierkegaard, 
1985, p. 83) 
 
Kierkegaard went to great length to argue against the acceptance of such an ethical 
existence as being how one should live the good life.  He demonstrated through the 
story of Abraham and Isaac that “the single individual now sets himself apart as the 
particular above the universal” (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 84).  Even though he took a 
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knife to his son Isaac, Abraham is not condemned as a murder but rather is elevated as 
father of the faithful.  He was justified in breaking the ethical imperative ‘not to 
murder’ by seeking a greater good.  Many other examples could be referred to such as 
Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn who lied in order to preserve the life of a black slave.  
It is not suggested here that there exists a hierarchy of values but rather that there can 
be justifications given for a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ - as described by 
Kierkegaard. 
 
If values are able to be ‘suspended’ in order to elevate the particular above the 
universal could this potentially lead to nihilisim?   One philosopher often accused of 
advancing nihilism especially through his ‘death of God’, is Nietzsche.  He 
challenged his readers to ‘sound out’ the idols of universally assumed givens and 
asked “Cannot all values be overturned?  And is Good perhaps Evil?” (Nietzsche, 
1996, p. 7). 
 
Through his ‘free spirits’ Nietzsche proclaimed – 
 
You had to become your own master, and also the master of your own virtues.  
Previously, your virtues were your masters; but they must be nothing more 
than your tools… according to your higher purpose. (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 9) 
 
Values then can be considered to be signs of higher purposes or as Charles Taylor 
(1989) describes, ‘hypergoods’.  These are often offered to be the ‘reasons’ for 
justifying certain valuing and are not used to demonstrate that values have intrinsic 
value.  Persons give meaning and value in the way that they relate as relational 
beings. 
 
Consequentialism readily demonstrates that particular ‘things’ or principles can never 
be both accurate and adequate, that is, they can never be so detailed and yet be 
universally applicable for every context.  Even in the more extreme case of ‘do not 
murder’ for example, it is difficult to universalise its applicability in cases of 
euthanasia, war of even when a request from a divinity (as per Abraham) requires the 
sacrifice of an innocent.  In these cases agents are pursuing particular purposes based 
upon their personal intentionality, and it is argued here that educative value is to be 
located in the intentionality of these agents rather that the values (as objects) 
themselves. 
 
 
Educative value 
It is contended here that not all values have educative value.  Dewey has argued that 
‘education’, just like ‘value’, is an abstract term and therefore has no ‘aims’ or 
purposes of and by itself.  Dewey (1985, p. 114) asserted that rather it is persons who 
have aims and purposes which are understood to have value in that they are good for 
attaining worthwhile ends, and that educative value is not possible to attribute to 
anything that is abstract. 
 
This may appear to be a rather inconsequential distinction to make.  However, the 
point to be made is that ‘education’ can have several conflicting values associated 
with ‘its’ aims and purposes simply as a result of the variety of individuals and 
societies who contribute to the meanings of education.   Education itself is normative 
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not descriptive, recommending what ‘ought’ to be rather than what is.  Therefore it is 
likened to an ethical claim of what ought to be rather than a factual claim of what ‘is’.   
 
The relation between education and ethics has been explored at length by R. S. Peters 
in his book Ethics and Education.  Here Peters (1970, p. 28) explained that engaging 
with the ‘aims of education’ is “a way of getting people to get clear about and focus 
their attention on what is worthwhile achieving” [my emphasis].  For example 
‘honesty’ has often been suggested as a value that some teachers have and that they 
try to promote.  But as an entity of and by itself, does honesty have intrinsic value?   
 
According to the VCAA document it would appear that honesty does have intrinsic 
value and certainly there are instances, and probably a great many could be put 
forward to demonstrate how honesty can be worthwhile and how it offers value.  Such 
instances submitted would no doubt refer to the ‘good’ that such a value is able to 
contribute.  However, it is this particular attribute that makes the notion of values so 
problematic.  Can it be more worthwhile in an educational context to be dishonest 
with learners?  Being involved in an educational setting, is there a case for a teacher 
to lie to students and claim for example that s/he is unable to work out a particular 
problem that has been set? 
 
I am sure many educators have adopted such strategies and lied to students in order 
for them to adopt a less dependant approach to their own problem solving and 
learning.  That is a sort of teleological suspension of the ethical as described by 
Kierkegaard.  Dishonesty, then, can have educative value because it can be used as a 
tool to achieve something educationally valuable.  Therefore, it is argued here that 
neither honesty nor dishonesty have any intrinsic value of and by themselves.  Their 
usefulness to us as educators is determined by our relation to them, that is, how we as 
agents value their potential as we pursue our personal aims of our educational 
enterprise. 
 
In one of his well known works on educative aims, Peters (1973, p. 125) argued that 
“Values are involved in education not so much as goals or end-products, but as 
principles implicit in different manners of proceeding or producing”.  It is the manner 
rather than the matter that is to provide an important criterion for judging the 
educative value of an experience.  Peters (1973, p. 131) here claimed that pursuing the 
matter and the ‘ends’ of education, such as self-realization, “encourages an 
instrumental way of looking at the problem of justification” to the point that “it is 
erroneously assumed that education must be justified by reference to an end which is 
extrinsic to it”.  This is clearly the approach adopted by the authors of the VCAA 
document who appeal to ideals of both economics and citizenship to justify their 
framework of values. 
 
It is contended here that the framework of values as promoted by the VCAA are in 
fact mis-educative.  That is, they restrict the possible growth that can occur for 
learners that enable them to be critical and intelligent decision makers.  As educated 
persons they should “be a challenge to the status quo” (Pring, 1988, p. 42) and “the 
citizen’s worst enemy” (Bauman, 2001, p. 26) where ‘enemy’ here is to be understood 
similarly to Nietzsche’s usage which refers to a positive critical consciousness. 
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According to Phillips (1971, p. 70), the enterprise of education implies that 
worthwhile changes must occur within the learner, but “if, for instance, education 
were merely a means for producing social cohesion or a trained workforce, then 
educational changes would not be valuable in themselves”.  On this point Phillips 
goes on to reference Dewey who argued that the educational process is its own end 
and does not have an end beyond itself.   
 
Dewey argued that educative value cannot be attributed to any subject matter in itself 
(such as the VCAA’s set of values), because if it did, then the implication would be 
that “the attitude of pupils must, upon the whole, be one of docility, receptivity and 
obedience” (Dewey, 1938/97, p. 18).  He claimed that instead, educative value is to be 
determined by the two principles of continuity and interaction. 
 
The first principle of continuity refers to the overall development of the being of the 
learner, as a social, intellectual and moral agent.  The educative growth of the learner 
is to be determined by the type of attitudes s/he develops, especially with regards to 
continuing to learn. 
 
The second principle of interaction refers to the context of the individual learner in 
relation to the entities in his/her environment.  These entities could be real objects, 
ideas or ideals – such as the essential values promoted by the VCAA.  What is of 
significance here is the relation that the individual learner has towards these entities.  
Dewey criticises traditional education for neglecting the internal disposition of the 
individual learners because it is from the learners’ perspective that meanings are to be 
formulated. 
 
 
Intentionality 
It is argued here that valuing is an expression of the intentionality of individual 
persons.  The individual is understood to be a meaning-maker rather than a passive 
recipient of meaning bestowing entities – such as objective values.  As entities who 
have at least some agency (Kearney, 1987, p. 55-56), learners act in intentional ways.  
These intentions are part of one’s whole being including intuitions, emotions and 
cognitive understandings.  It is argued here that the subjective relations of the 
individual learners have far greater significance for determining educative value than 
any entities from which the learners have been decentred.  Such an emphasis is 
reflective of Kierkegaard’s (1992, P. 203) argument that “subjectivity is truth”. 
 
Similarly for Nietzsche (1998, p. 85), there is no ‘truth’ in an absolute sense but “only 
a perspectival seeing” which makes ‘objectivity’ absurd and a non-concept.  Similarly 
Heidegger opposed the notion that ‘truth’ should be used to represent the 
correspondence between statement and ‘fact’, and argued that truth should be thought 
of in terms of the Greek aletheia (meaning ‘taking things out of their concealment’).  
Such a definition of truth means that one can be “in” truth (Heidegger, 1988, p. 18) in 
this regard when coming to understand a phenomenon, not for what the thing is - as 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology attempted to portray - but from the 
perspective of existential phenomenology, being in truth means how a meaning, a 
phenomenon, is understood in relation to oneself. 
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A foundation for meaning can be gained through lived experience 
phenomenologically rather than through a particular philosophy (Garrison, 1987, p. 
487) even although on the surface such lived experiences appear “fraught with 
ambiguity, ambivalence, and contradiction” (Britzman, 1992, p. 25).  Being in 
relation, truth for the individual refers to how one relates to what one understands.  
The focus of concern for educative value then is how the learner relates, not what is 
being related to – such as a particular set of values. 
 
This notion of how has major implications for the purposes that one has and according 
to Dewey (1938, p. 45) it is precisely the purposes of learners which have been 
neglected by traditional education.  Personal identity is gained by how an individual 
relates and values his or her relations and is not made through objective or abstract 
categories which relate to the ‘what’ of one’s being.  One’s entire identity is only 
partly able to be revealed by particular values which can be demonstrated and 
observed and by the actual purposes of education that one may be able to articulate as 
one’s own. 
 
Such stated aims and values are likened to Nietzsche’s (1998, p. 51) analysis of 
utilities, in that they are only signs which have a functional meaning attributed to it 
from a person exercising his or her will.  More telling is how one relates to such 
purposes.  This therefore indicates that attention needs to be given to the manner in 
which teachers, as professional educators, personally relate to their particular meaning 
and aim of education, that is, their intentionality, with reference to what they 
understand to be the meaning and purpose of human existence. 
 
This may at first appear to be quite a hyperbole to claim that in order to formulate a 
clear and professional understanding of educative value, reference must be made to 
metaphysics.  However, this is exactly what is argued by some educators including 
Postman (1996, p. 27) who argues that the main problem facing education is not 
technical in nature but metaphysical. 
 
By suggesting that we make intentionality the focus, we are more able to identify 
educative value.  If educators are to engage in the meaning that learners have in 
valuing certain standards, principles and actions, then they must be willing to engage 
with learners’ intentionality.  As meaning-makers people do not live by meanings 
which are perceived from sources external to us.  We are beings-in-the-world and 
therefore are intimately involved with any meaning making.  Therefore ‘life’, as with 
‘education’ – and indeed any proposed framework of education – cannot offer ready-
made intentions, meanings and understandings to be ‘unpacked’ (Searle, 1983, p. 27).  
We need to actively make sense of our experiences and determine what is to be 
regarded as important, worthwhile and valuable as critical and responsible members 
of our communities. 
 
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued here that the VCAA document which presents a set of values to be 
taught, is not educationally valuable but is rather mis-educative.  In order for there to 
be educative value, there needs to be a worthwhile interaction between the learner and 
the various entities in his or her environment.  It is in the manner or the how of this 
interaction that eductive value can be established, and this includes the specific 
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attitudes developed by the learner.  It is contended here that such an approach to 
establishing educative value is dependant upon the professionalism of the individual 
educators involved in providing suitable environments for particular learners. 
 
However, this professionalism is often marginalised by governmental initiatives to 
control the curriculum, which is certainly not a recent phenomenon.  According to 
Dewey, 
 
Traditional education did not have to face this problem [i.e. determining the 
educative value of experiences]; it could systematically dodge this 
responsibility.  The school environment of desks, blackboards, a small school 
yard, was supposed to suffice.  There was no demand that the teacher should 
become intimately acquainted with the conditions of the local community, 
physical, historical, economic, occupational, etc., in order to utilize them as 
educational resources. (Dewey, 1938/97, p. 40) 
 
What Dewey is referring to here is the lack of acknowledgement given by traditional 
education systems to the professionalism of the individual teachers to conduct 
situational analyses and make judgements as to the appropriateness of certain 
experiences for particular learners.  Such a controlling bureaucratic approach 
effectively nullifies debate as to the educative value of its provision of resources and 
proposed curriculum, which is argued here to be also reflected in the VCAA's 
approach to values. 
 
There is a noticeable absence in the opportunity for professional teachers to determine 
how the educative value of such values might be determined in their own particular 
contexts.  By presenting their list of values (which are particularly suited to compliant 
citizenship and productive workers) as those values widely shared by Australian 
school communities, the authors of this VCAA document have effectively nullified 
any further examination of them, because to do so would place the questioner at odds 
with what is being the assumed position of the nation’s majority of school 
communities. 
 
If educators are to retain a healthy level of professionalism within the teaching 
fraternity, we should take up Nietzsche’s challenge to sound out these values for the 
specific purpose of determining how their educative value is to be determined.  
Otherwise if we adopt an all-too-ready mindset of passive and docile acceptance of 
this proposed list of values, then these are likely to become blindly accepted 
instruments of things we think with, rather than entities with which we intelligently 
think about in a most educationally valuably manner. 
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